Shareholders of a Turkish limited company may wish to establish another business in the same sector, invest in a competitor, or work directly with company customers. Whether this is prohibited cannot be answered from shareholder status alone. Management duties, the articles, loyalty obligations, the relevant market, and the actual conduct must be considered together.
The Turkish Commercial Code provides related but distinct rules for shareholders and managers. A non-compete restriction cannot be expanded without limit; the company's legitimate interest must be balanced against freedom to work and conduct business. Attorney Mehmet Kurşun can separate ownership and management roles when assessing enforceability and possible remedies.
Not every shareholder of a limited company is automatically a manager. A passive shareholder is principally subject to the loyalty and confidentiality duties in Article 613. A shareholder who is also a manager is additionally subject to the care, loyalty, and non-compete rules of Article 626.
This distinction is decisive. A minority investor holding a small passive interest in another business differs from a manager using customer information to operate the same business personally. A Turkish company law review should examine authority, responsibilities, and access to information.
Under Article 613, shareholders must protect company secrets, and this duty cannot be removed by the articles or a general-assembly resolution. They must avoid conduct capable of harming company interests, particularly transactions that create a special personal benefit while damaging the corporate purpose.
The loyalty duty does not impose an unlimited ban on all outside work. The analysis considers whether there is actual competition, use of company information, diversion of customers or employees, and economic harm. An investment with no real conflict may be treated differently.
The articles of association may prohibit shareholders from competing with the company. The clause should clearly identify the activity, persons, duration, and where appropriate the geographical area. Broad wording such as a ban on every commercial activity creates enforceability problems.
Drafting should identify the market, customer base, and know-how that genuinely require protection. The restriction should not unnecessarily destroy a shareholder's economic future. Excessive clauses may be challenged under mandatory rules, good faith, and freedom to work.
Article 626 requires managers and persons entrusted with management to perform their duties with care and protect company interests in good faith. Unless the articles provide otherwise or valid permission is obtained, they may not engage in activities competing with the company.
A manager may violate the duty by offering services to company customers through another business, managing a competitor, diverting a corporate opportunity, or using trade secrets in a rival activity. The connection with the company's actual business and the information available to the manager are important.
Unless the articles establish another mechanism, the Code allows permission through written approval of all other shareholders. The articles may instead require approval by the general assembly.
Permission may be limited to a specific transaction, customer group, geographical area, or period. A written approval should define the permitted activity rather than use a vague general waiver. Voting disqualification and the required majority should also be checked where the interested person participates in the decision.
Using the same registered activity code is not always sufficient. The product market, geographic market, customer group, and actual operations should be examined. Investment in a field the company has never pursued or realistically planned may not amount to competition.
A small investment without management influence differs from a controlling interest or an active board role in a competitor. Ownership percentage, voting power, managerial authority, access to information, and economic links all matter.
Activity through a spouse, relative, or affiliated company is assessed by substance rather than appearance. Funding, instructions, profit flows, and customer contact may reveal indirect control. Family relationship alone, however, does not prove a violation.
Collection of evidence must respect personal data, privacy of communications, and rules excluding unlawfully obtained evidence. Data on a company device is not automatically available for unlimited use. Authority, notice, purpose, and proportionality should be checked.
The company may seek compensation for proven loss and an order stopping the violation. A valid contractual penalty may be claimed under its terms. Requests for surrender of profit or treatment of a transaction as made for the company's account require a clear legal or contractual basis in the circumstances.
Removal and management liability may arise for a manager; just-cause expulsion or dissolution may be considered for a shareholder. If the facts also involve unfair competition, trade-secret misuse, or intellectual-property infringement, separate claims and protective measures may be combined where procedurally appropriate.
Interim relief may be requested when customer diversion, disclosure of confidential information, or irreparable market loss continues. The application should target defined conduct, such as use of particular data, approaches to identified customers, or publication of specified content.
A broad order shutting down an entire business requires strong evidence and a serious risk. The court examines prima facie proof, balance of interests, and security. Assistance from a commercial litigation lawyer helps connect the proposed measure to the precise legitimate interest requiring protection.
A serious and continuing violation that destroys corporate trust may constitute just cause. Contractual expulsion grounds, general-assembly authority, and the judicial route must be reviewed separately. The most severe remedy may be disproportionate for a minor, isolated incident.
Voting and representation problems require special attention in two-shareholder companies. If the conflict completely paralyses operations, voluntary exit, judicial expulsion, or dissolution for just cause should be compared from both procedural and economic perspectives.
Ending the corporate relationship does not necessarily remove the duty to protect trade secrets. A post-termination non-compete obligation may depend on a clear contractual clause and its enforceability.
Duration, territory, and activity should be limited to the company's legitimate interest. A perpetual restriction covering entire industries may unreasonably interfere with freedom to work. A contractual penalty can also be reviewed for legal validity and proportionality.
The articles should define prohibited activity, the permission process, and consequences. Managers should disclose outside interests and roles in other companies. Trade secrets should be classified, access to customer data limited by role, and device policies documented.
Attorney Mehmet Kurşun can assess drafting, permission resolutions, and lawful preservation of evidence together. An Istanbul company lawyer approach focuses not only on litigation but also on protecting customer relationships and business continuity.
Direct corporate loss may involve lost customers, reduced sales, loss of a pricing advantage, and additional protection costs. The calculation should be supported by data before and after the breach rather than assumptions alone. The entire turnover of the rival activity is not automatically the company's loss; costs, causation, and the probability that the company would have obtained the business matter.
If a contractual penalty applies, the occurrence of the breach, scope of the clause, and possible reduction may be disputed. Whether the company may claim both the penalty and additional loss depends on the contract and applicable law. The relief should avoid double recovery and coordinate compensation, cessation, and disclosure requests.
No. Shareholders owe statutory loyalty, but management status and the articles determine whether a specific non-compete duty applies.
Yes, using the method required by law and the articles. The permitted activity should be clearly defined in writing.
No. Ownership level, management influence, information access, and actual competitive effect should be assessed.